Counterfeit parts have become widespread over the last 20 years, and their infiltration into critical systems poses a significant economic risk as well as a risk to human life and national security. Critical systems include those associated with human safety (e.g., transportation, medical), the delivery of critical services (e.g., infrastructure, energy generation), humanitarian and military missions, and global economic stability. These systems are expensive to procure, must be supported for very long periods of time, and the consequences, if compromised by counterfeit parts, can be catastrophic. This project will develop methods of disrupting the counterfeit hardware networks for critical systems guided by socio-technical network development and modeling, and through consideration of the counterfeiting network’s connections to other illicit trafficking networks. Counterfeit hardware addressed in this project includes electronic and non-electronic hardware and hardware that is created via additive manufacturing.

The majority of the treatment of the counterfeit electronic part problem to date is focused on the detection of counterfeits, which is necessary, but represents treating the symptom, not the cause. In this project, we will conduct a series of workshops that include stakeholders from industry, policy, legal, supply chain, government acquisition, industrial security, and anti-trafficking organizations. The workshops will be used to guide socio-technical network development and modeling, and include consideration of the counterfeiting network’s connections to other illicit trafficking networks. The technical attributes of the problem include: part flows within sustainment networks for critical systems, procurement and acquisition practices, counterfeit detection technologies, and inventory management. The socio-attributes include trust, communication (including significant counterfeit reporting stigmas), and incentive reactions. The network models developed will consider both commercial transactions and military acquisition systems to enable identification of possible points of disruption in those networks. The model for the counterfeit part network developed in this project will form an important and necessary enabler for possible future blockchain-based solutions and is an essential component of a digital twin for the supply chain for critical systems.

Project Partner Organizations:

• MChESS – Maryland Center of Excellence for Sustainment Sciences
• CALCE – Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering
• CPPPE – Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise
• ARLIS - Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security
• START - National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
• DC I-Corps – NSF I-Corps node at the University of Maryland

Project Data Providers:

• ERAI
• ECIA – Electronic Component Industries Association
• Lockheed Martin

Workshops:

Several workshops were held during this project.

• I-Corps Customer Discovery Training (November 5, 2020) - To prepare the project team to efficiently and effectively operate the planned workshops (and to identify the appropriate participants), we will engage DC NSF I-Corps node (which is hosted by the University of Maryland) to educate and guide us on relevant customer discovery processes.
• Workshop at the SMTA Annual Counterfeit Symposium (summer 2021 and 2022) – This workshop focused on building an understanding of the electronic part counterfeiting network. Enterprise Network Models for Counterfeit Electronic Parts Supply Chains (August 2021).
• Compromised Additive Manufacturing Supply Chain Workshop (June 2021) – This workshop focused on the unique issues posed by additive manufacturing (AM).
• Intersection of Illicit Trafficking and Counterfeit Parts Workshop (October 2021) - This workshop focused on identification of where the network connects to other illicit trafficking activities.
• Safeguarding Critical System Supply Chains Against Compromise (July 2022) - This workshop focuses on the unique issues posed by compromised components (hardware, material, software, data, algorithms, humans), and how they can be predicted and mitigated.  This is a convergent workshop whose participants will include academics, industry practitioners, and stakeholders from the critical systems community whose concern is disruption and compromise of the technology and supply chain for critical systems.

Contacts:

• Project Principle Investigator: Peter Sandborn (sandborn@umd.edu)
• Co-PI: Diganta Das (diganta@umd.edu)
• Co-PI: William Lucyshyn (lucyshyn@umd.edu)